Ética Global

Bienvenid@s a su curso de Ética Global

Espero que juntos aprendamos mucho este semestre.

El syllabus es el siguiente:


https://www.dropbox.com/s/588dhppp0020uvr/SyllabusÉticaGlobalUP.docx?dl=0

Comenzaremos por revisar

Shapiro “qué significa qué es el Derecho” y “La Naturaleza de un objeto” pp. 28-29 y 32-45

y 

Tasioulas, John, “On the nature of human rights,” pp., 17-26.


https://www.dropbox.com/s/zo5b5qcyk67adnp/John%20Tasioulas.%20The%20fundations%20of%20human%20rights.pdf?dl=0



https://www.dropbox.com/s/bpbbvoas2t4n13e/ScottShapiro%20Legalidad.pdf?dl=0

Por favor contesten las siguientes preguntas acerca de la lectura de Tasioulas

• ¿Cómo se identifica el núcleo normativo de los DH?
• ¿Cómo se distingue el problema de la naturaleza del problema de los fundamentos?
• Según la visión reduccionista ¿cuál es la naturaleza de los DH?
• ¿Cuál es la principal objeción a la visión reduccionista?

What is a Theory?

A theory is an explanation of something. It is typically an explanation of a class of phenomena, rather than a single specific event. Instead of explaining why there is a brown stain on my tie, a theory would explain why men's ties often have brown stains. 

Theories are often expressed as chains of causality: this happens because this and that happened just when something else happened and this in turn happened because ... you get the idea!

Theories are sometimes confused with hypotheses, because both seem to consist of statements relating one variable to another. Well, it's true that some theories are little more than hypotheses. But good theories are a bit different. Here are some of the differences: 

• theories are more general
• theories explain why things are related, whereas hypotheses just say they are related
• theories generate hypotheses; hypotheses are implicit in theories

As discussed in the next section, one way that theories explain is by providing a sense of process or mechanism for how one thing is related to another. This is very important. 

Having a sense of process is an attribute or characteristic of a good theory. There are many characteristics that make a theory good. It is not just whether the theory is correct or not. In fact, the correctness of a theory is a very complicated issue, and is not quite as important as you might think.

Correctness of Theories

Unfortunately, we can never prove a theory right. We can prove it wrong, but can never prove it right. There are two reasons for this. First, it doesn't matter how many times you test a theory, there is not enough time in the universe to do all possible tests. So even if a theory has survived 100 tests, it could still fail the 101st test. In a way, the situation is the opposite of locating a missing object in a house. If you search for the object in the house and find it, well, it's definite that the object was in the house -- case closed. But if you search and don't find it, that doesn't absolutely mean that the object is not in the house. It could still be there, you just missed it. The same (well, the opposite) is true of theories. If you test a theory and it fails, that's it: it's been disproved. But if you test it and it passes, that's just one test. There may be other data out there, or other situations, that will disprove. You just haven't gotten to them yet.

The second reason you can't prove a theory true is that there is never just one theory that fits the facts. A theory is really just a narrative. A tale that explains. But stories can be told very differently. In a sense, there are always an infinite number of theories that fit the facts. Think for example of Newtonian theories for the motion of bodies -- equations like f = ma. Those theories served us very well for a very long time. But now, we have replaced Newtonian physics with a whole new theory brought to light by Einstein. Was Newton wrong? Not exactly. His theories were correct as far as they went. They predicted the motion of bodies quite well: well, enough, for example to build airplanes that actually fly. Engineers still use Newton's theories to build certain things. But for other things, today we use entirely different equations built on a completely different understanding of the physical universe to do exactly the same thing. The new theory explains additional phenomena that the old theory didn't -- for example, according to Newtonian theory, objects should not change mass as they approach the speed of light (which they do), nor should time slow down.

Fuente: http://www.analytictech.com/mb870/handouts/theorizing.htm

Session 2: Global Ethics

Central Problem. It is not clear what justice on a global scale consists in. What sorts of duties of justice, if any, exist among human beings who do not reside in the same country? If there are such duties, what grounds them?

Central Thesis. In general, a problem is one of global justice when the problem either affects agents resident in more than one state or the problem is unresolvable without their co-operation. For the problem to be considered genuinely global rather than regional it should affect more than one regional area.

Main Contrasts. We do not know what morality requires from us in the international arena mainly because three kinds of dilemmas or underdetermined areas.

The Moral Ground of Justice

Global Distributive Justice. Maximalism: John Rawls’s principles developed for the case of domestic justice, notably, the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle or the Difference Principle, should apply globally (Caney 2005, Moellendorf 2002).

Global Minimalist Justice. Minimalism: The content of our duties to one another is best explored by examining alternative concepts not featured in the Rawlsian corpus, such as capabilities or human rights (Nussbaum 2006, Pogge 2008).

The Moral Character of Liberal Democracies

Moral Egalitarianism. All human individuals are entitled to equal moral consideration. For instance, liberalism requires a sort of priority of liberties: In virtue of their status as human all human beings are free.  Typically, things that are a matter of luck or fortune cannot be allowed to serve as the basis for a distinction in equality of treatment.

Political Egalitarianism. Liberal political theory has traditionally applied its egalitarian guarantees only within the confines of the territorial state and citizenship. For instance democracy requires a circumscribed demos.  

The Moral Character of International Relations.

Realism. Realists may wish to conclude that moral considerations are not appropriate when discussing international politics, because standards of morality are not relevant when it comes to international affairs. Even if important, moral reasons are the weakest anyone could invoke, and they are unlikely to influence international politics.

Moralism. In general, moral reasons are weaker than pragmatic ones. But it seems doubtful that moral considerations are always the weakest one could invoke in matters of foreign policy. States have a moral character when they abide to certain moral principles or moral rights. From this perspective, legitimacy, justice and fairness are political virtues that assess how well (or not) a state and its institutions live up to their own particular moral standards. Liberal democracies are a kind of state with a particular moral character. Consider these common practices and facts of international affairs:

·       global interdependency. The financial and international trade systems, and even global climate changes, suggest that the welfare of states relies on responsible actions and policies that every state should take.

·       the fact of globalization. The current technologies in transportation and the electronic mass-media, as well as the increment of the global population, imply that the world is now much smaller than it was a century ago, in the sense that a great many are now aware of the circumstances and opportunities everywhere.

·       the fact of international cooperation. Liberal democracies have willingly and knowingly engaged in the construction of a complex and pervasive international system that encompasses financial, trade, diplomatic and mutual support activities. The establishment of this international system has taken interdependency and globalization to levels never seen before. These general facts of international relations entail that international cooperation with a moral character is both possible and necessary.

Global Duties. What ought we to do for the 1 billion or so people who currently live in poverty?

·       Peter Singer: Help Principle: Infant is drowning in a shallow pond. Just as you would be obligated to (when it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything comparable, it is wrong not to prevent the bad from occurring); Singer argues that it entails extensive duties to assist needy others, whether they be geographically proximate or not (Singer 1972; Unger 1996).

·       Thomas Pogge: Harm Principle: We harm the global poor when we collaborate in imposing an unjust global institutional order on them. Since developed countries impose a coercive global order on the poor that foreseeably and avoidably causes great harm, they have important responsibilities to reform the global order such that it ceases to do so and instead better secures human rights (Pogge 2002, 2008, 2010).

·       Amartya Sen: Promote the Good: Capabilities approach provides an improved measure of well-being and constitutes a better way to capture changes in people’s condition over time (Sen 1980).

Special Duties. When considering what we owe one another, are compatriots special? Do we have the same duties to non-compatriots as we have to compatriots or is there some principled way in which these two sets of duties ought to differ?

i.         Nationalism: To impose global responsibilities ignores an important aspect of how we relate—and ought to relate—to one another.

·       Instrumental. There is nothing inherently special about our co-national relationships but state boundaries are useful in assigning important duties to particular agents (Goodin 1998).

·       Intrinsic. nations can provide a valuable grounding for social attachment, identity and meaning in life, and can ground special obligations to strengthen national life and assist co-nationals.

La Naturaleza de una cosa: Shapiro: Problemas conceptuales.

Central Problem: What exactly it is that we want to know when we inquire into the nature of something (8).

Central Thesis. Identity, necessary implications and conditions of possibility (8).

Identity. What it is to be that thing (8). What it is about X that makes it X and not Y or n. A correct answer must supply the set of properties that make (possible or actual) instances of X the things that they are. For instance, to ask “What is knowledge” is to ask what it is about knowledge that makes it knowledge. The classic answer to the question maintains that knowledge is true and justified belief.

Condition 1. What makes all and only instances of HUMAN RIGHTS instances of HUMAN RIGHTS and not something else.

Necessary Implications. The search for the necessary and interesting properties of something (12). What necessarily follows from the fact that it is what it is and not something else (9). Properties that it necessarily has or properties that it could not fail to have. Conceptual analysis though does not deal or catalogue always all necessary properties. It deals with interesting properties. it depends on which issues and phenomena seem most perplexing at a given time (19). As a result, theories that proceed by means of conceptual analysis are never complete.

Number `3´ (9)
Identity	Implications
successor of 2. Intercessor of 4.	3 is a prime number: if a number is not prime, then it is impossible for it to be 3

Condition 2. to discover the HR’s nature, in this second sense, would be in part to discover

it’s necessary properties, that is, those properties that HR could not fail to have. What must be true of a HR because it is a HR and not a regular right, a moral right, a natural right and so forth?

Condition of interest or relevance: When asking about the nature of HR, for example, we want to know which properties HR necessarily possess in virtue of being an instance of HR and not law, moral rights, natural rights, rights of man, Christian commands or some other thing (10).

Contingent Matters. When philosophers ask the Implication Question about an object, they are interested not just in what necessarily follows from the fact that the object in question has a certain identity but also in what does not necessarily follow.

Condition 4. Many philosophers have been eager to show that whether there is legal recognition to HR is a contingent feature of HR. Thus, they maintain that part of the answer to the Implication Question is that it does not follow from the fact that something is a HR that a given legal system recognise it as such.

Conceptual Analysis: Shapiro

“descriptive metaphysics,” “reflective equilibrium,” and “rational reconstruction.”: gathering of truisms about a given entity (13).

Philosophers collect clues and uses the process of elimination in order to elucidate the identity of the entity that falls under the concept in question. The philosophical clues, in other words, are not merely true, but self-evidently so. For instance it is a truism that one cannot know some fact unless one believes that fact. This is an obvious truth about knowledge.

Knowledge: true, justified belief: fits a comprehensive truistic description of knowledge.

·      The claim that instances of knowledge must be beliefs accounts for the fact that one cannot know something if one does not believe it.

·      how it is possible for two people to know the same fact.

·      That knowledge consists of beliefs that are true explains why knowledge is inconsistent with error

·      why knowing things about the world is useful,

·      why two people who have contradictory beliefs cannot both be in the know.

·      That knowledge consists of beliefs that are not only true but also justified accounts for the fact that knowledge warrants deference

·      that experts know more than nonexperts, that knowledge about the world requires supporting evidence.

Having determined the answer to the Identity Question in this way, the philosopher may then go on to infer additional necessary truths about the entity in question for the purposes of answering the Implication Question.

·      we can see that knowledge is “agglomerable,” which is to say that if one knows that p and one knows that q, and one believes that p and q, then it necessarily follows that one knows that p and q. This is so because (1) one possesses the belief that p and q; (2) one will be justified in believing that p and q because one believes that p and believes that q; and (3) both p and q are true given that one knows that p and knows that q. Hence, it follows necessarily from the fact that  knowledge is true, justifi ed belief that one will know that p and q just in case one knows that p and knows that q and believes that p and q.

Example of a conceptual problem. (Source: Steans/Pettiford/Diez: 5)

The ‘War on Terror’, launched by the US and its allies in the wake of the attack on the World

Trade Center has served to elevate terrorism to the next great ‘threat’ to global security. There is nothing ‘new’ about terrorism. Unfortunately, it is a phenomenon that has long been a part of both national and international politics. The terrorist is seen to strike indiscriminately, seemingly making no distinction between ‘legitimate’ military and political targets and civilians. However, it is difficult in practice to differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence. US government agencies are, in fact, inconsistent in the way they define terrorist and non-terrorists groups and action. Ultimately, it might be that ‘terrorists’, as opposed to ‘freedom fighters’, are those people who threaten or deploy force for a cause of which we do not approve. If no satisfactory legal definition for terrorism exists and it remains difficult to draw clear distinctions between the morality of terrorism as opposed to conventional warfare that involves civilian casualties and deaths, then we must ask how do some groups/agents/actions come to be defined as ‘terrorist’ and how this serves to legitimise certain kinds of violence – such as ‘War on Terror’ – as morally justified. This highlights that it is not only the concrete actions and dramatic events themselves occurring in international relations. Such as that which occurred in New York on September 11, but also the way in which we interpret certain acts and how discourses emerge on ‘threats’ to national and international security.

La Naturaleza de los Derechos Humanos: Tasioulas

 Existen cuando menos tres formas de caracterizar a los DH:

·       Caracterización descriptiva: que se explican a partir de características psicológicas, sociales o institucionales.

·       Caracterización Positiva: se refieren a investigaciones realizadas por historiadores, sociólogos, politólogos y abogados, donde los DH son referentes a un sistema de creencia prevaleciente en ciertos puntos de la cultura occidental y que describe a los derechos como parte de un orden legal positivo donde todos están bajo su jurisdicción.

·       Caracterización Normativa: Los DH son estándares normativos o “reason-giving” de cierto tipo. (17)

Con el fin de discutir el núcleo normativo de los DH Tasioulas establece el siguiente desiderata:

·       Distintividad. Una teoría de los DH debe plasmar la importancia distintiva de esta clase de estándares normativos. Esto se puede hacer respondiendo la pregunta ¿qué distingue a los DH de otras normas, en qué radica su importancia?

·       Fidelidad. Deben apegarse a la cultura de los DH, que se liga a las concepciones de los DH que han emergido a partir de la Declaración de los Derechos Humanos. Este desiderata tiene que ver con la forma en la que la teoría de los DH y sus distintos instrumentos se armonizan con la práctica de los mismos.

·       No-Parroquialismo. Una teoría (adecuada, no escéptica) de los DH debe mostrarlos como estándares normativos con una fuerza genuina de la razón. Dentro de éste desiderata se debe mostrar cómo es que los DH no son un mero instrumento de la cultura occidental o que solo pertenecen a una visión liberal y está dentro del uso de sus conceptos. Este desiderata lo llama desiderata del no-etnocentrismo[1]. (18)

El desiderata sirve para discutir el problema de la naturaleza de los DH, no el problema de los fundamentos. Se trata de una distinción conceptualmente posible que sin embargo no nos compromete con la existencia de estos derechos. Tasioulas insiste que el debate de los derechos humanos es una discusión doctrinal y no sólo criterial, porque podemos identificar un desacuerdo en una materia de discusión común.

·       El problema de la naturaleza de los DH está en identificar qué es aquello que identifica el concepto de los DH a diferencia de otros conceptos normativos.

·       El problema del fundamento de los DH se puede explicar con la pregunta de ¿cuáles son las condiciones bajo con las cuales puede ser llamado genuinamente DH? (19)

Hay cuando menos tres visiones típicas sobre la naturaleza de los DH:

·       Visión ortodoxa: Afirma que los DH son derechos morales que poseen los seres humanos en virtud de su humanidad.

·       Visión reduccionista: Afirma que el fundamento de los DH se encuentra en una categoría más general es la de capacidades.

·       Visión política: Da a los DH una función política, los DH tienen una legitimidad política para la intervención internacional.

Visión Reduccionista: Decir que existe un DH a x equivale a decir que para el caso de todos los seres humanos, tener acceso a x es valioso de una manera que puede especificarse de manera independiente a la noción de derecho; por ejemplo bienes humanos fundamentales o reclamos especiales de igualdad o respeto (21).

Objeciones Generales:

·       El lenguaje de los DH se hace redundante si hablamos de ellos como meros intereses humanos. hablar acerca de los intereses humanos nos refiere a hablar del bienestar y qué es lo que lo impulsa. Con lo cual no se está hablando del nivel moral que poseen los DH. Por lo que el autor afirma que en el lenguaje de los DH existente un discurso moral que no puede ser reducido a los intereses humanos. (22)

·       Existe una falta de fidelidad a la cultura de los DH que no permite dar cuenta de la importancia de los DH.

Dos versiones del Reduccionismo:

·       La teoría de las capacidades básicas (Sen/Nussbaum). Las capacidades son las oportunidades que efectivamente pueden tener los individuos de realizar un rango amplio de estados de cosas y acciones; por ejemplo la vida, la salud del cuerpo, integridad física, sentidos, imaginación, pensamiento, emociones, razón práctica, afiliación, juego, control sobre el medio ambiente. La teoría de las capacidades parece que responde al problema de la redundancia, pues las capacidades no son equivalentes a los intereses humanos.

·       La teoría de la personalidad (Griffin) se centra en nuestro supuesto interés fundamental en tener agencia o personalidad moral, pues son cualidades que hacen posible la autonomía y la libertad.  Por ello no hay razón por la cual los DH deban ser definidos como  derechos morales pues es suficiente notar su importancia práctica alrededor de los valores de la personalidad. (23)

Si bien estas teorías hacen frente al problema de la redundancia, tienen los siguientes problemas:

·       Las dos teorías tienen serias dificultadas para explicar cómo podrían atribuirse DH a aquellos que carecen de la capacidad de elegir, como por ejemplo niños pequeños, personas con capacidades especiales o personas seriamente discapacitadas.

·       No logran capturar la dimensión moral de los derechos humanos: por ejemplo si impides mi capacidad para involucrarme en un trabajo valioso porque eres mejor candidato que yo, no podemos decir que me has hecho algo incorrecto; o si te niegas a regalarme un riñón para que yo disfrute de la capacidad de seguir con vida.

Griffin, como respuesta a estos problemas, intenta difuminar la distinción entre DH e intereses personales, pero eso lo hace más problemático pues los DH se hacen más susceptibles a ser auto-contradictorios. (ej. Del asesino que es encarcelado, ¿violan su DH a la libertad?) (24). Griffin tiene que concluir que la violación existe pero que considerándolo todo, es una violación justificable por las demandas de la justicia retributiva.

Una respuesta menos radical es la de Nussbaum que propone que el concepto de capacidades o de valores de la personalidad moral se reconstruya a partir de su profundidad moral de proteger demandas urgentes, que si no son protegidas implican un daño profundo. El problema es que esta maniobra en vez de proporcionar una idea de derechos morales, acaba por presuponerla. Pues sin esa presuposición de un derecho moral, no podemos explicar cómo se daña a las personas (25).

Como conclusión de la segunda sección afirma que las teorías y la visión reduccionista no captan el carácter moral de los DH. Esto sucede porque al identificar a los DH como fundamentados en una noción moral independiente y más general, se está dejando afuera el fondo moral que poseen por sí mismos los DH. (26)

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[1] No se me ocurre otra traducción

    TAREA: Leer con atención la sección III (26-43) del mismo texto de Tasioulas: 

https://www.dropbox.com/s/fal2gr801x91oy1/TasioulasThe%20fundations%20of%20human%20rights.pdf?dl=0

   

   CONTESTAR LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS:

·       ¿Qué caracteriza a la visión ortodoxa en contraste con la visión reduccionista?

·       ¿En qué consiste el problema de la transhistoricidad de los DH?

·       ¿Cómo propone Tasioulas que se solucione el problema de la trans-historicidad de los DH?

La Visión Ortodoxa: Tasioulas

 Tesis Central: (N): Los Derechos Humanos son Derechos Morales de TODOS los seres humanos en virtud de su humanidad (26).

(a) Derechos Morales (27):

Definición: Son derechos que se descubren por medio del razonamiento práctico o moral, en contraste con derechos revelados o derechos generados mediante convenciones sociales (artificiales)(26). Son un tipo particular de razones para la acción de tres maneras. En primer lugar son categóricos, esto quiere decir que su aplicación al agente, su fuerza y su firmeza son independientes de la motivación del agente. Segundo son excluyentes en su fuerza normativa, lo que significa que a la hora de ser sopesados junto con otras razones, excluye algunas razones como dignas a ser consideradas (27). Por ejemplo, la utilidad de privar a los mas talentosos de la libertad de ocupación no debe ser considerada como una razón (28). En tercer lugar, su transgresión autoriza un rango distintivo de respuestas morales como la indignación, la culpa, el resentimiento (28). Cuando son individuales, son fuente de obligaciones fundamentadas en un rasgo especial de los individuos.

Dificultad: Problema de fidelidad: Elaborar los DH como derechos morales nos pone en el centro de debates filosóficos que no capturan la elasticidad con la que el concepto es usado en la cultura de los DH. R= Describir los DH como derechos morales presenta ventajas que pueden describirse usando tres rasgos característicos de los derechos morales que permanecen invulnerables a las controversias porque capturan el significado del discurso ordinario, no filosófico, referente a los DH, en oposición a otros valores, metas e intereses humanos (27). Estos tres rasgos establecen a los DH como plenamente morales en un sentido deontológico y no como meros intereses o fines valiosos, porque desde la tercera persona un interés no implica un derecho (31).

i.         Deberes asociados a derechos. Normalmente los derechos morales se entienden como claim rights lo que quiere decir que la existencia de un derecho de la persona A a X, implica deberes varios para proteger el acceso o el disfrute de A a X. Un enfoque pluralista de los claim rights admite que a un derecho le correspondan no sólo deberes negativos de no interferencia sino también deberes positivos de actuar de cierta manera (28). Pero en contra de este enfoque pluralista existe una amplia tradición asociada con los derechos naturales que entiende a los DH como deberes de justicia fundamentalmente negativos. Pero según Tasioulas tenemos razones de fidelidad para rechazar esta visión.

La moralidad de los derechos no se opone a la moralidad de los deberes. El concepto de deber es anterior al concepto de derecho, así que pueden existir deberes morales sin correspondencia a algún derecho, por ejemplo, los deberes imperfectos tales como deberes de caridad o de misericordia que no son deberes de alguien en particular (29). Esta visión es compatible con el carácter super-erogativo de los DH.

ii.         Fundamento Individualista. Los DH son una subespecie de los derechos morales individuales, por eso son derechos de las personas. Este rasgo individualista de los DH esta capturado por la teoría del interés (Raz 1986), según la cual son algunos intereses de las personas los que son capaces de generar deberes en otros. Pero los derechos morales constituyen limitaciones relativas al agente acerca de lo que podemos hacer para favorecer nuestros intereses. Por eso otros teóricos no fundamentan los DH en los intereses sino en un estatus moral especial de las personas. En cualquier caso, la naturaleza individual de los DH los hace vulnerables a críticas marxistas que las acusan de basarse en una visión atomista equivocada de la vida humana (30). Pero esta crítica es muy parcial precisamente porque los derechos morales constituyen límites en la persecución de fines egoístas o auto-interesados. Más aún los DH requieren deberes positivos que responden a la necesidad de entablar formas valiosas de relación comunitaria y de protección a los intereses y bienestar de los demás.

iii.         El carácter específico de la violación. Los DH son poseídos por individuos identificables, por lo que su violación implica un daño al portador del derecho, lo que contrasta con la violación a deberes imperfectos que no constituyen un daño a una persona en particular.

(b) de TODOS los seres humanos

La afirmación de que los DH los poseen todos los derechos humanos necesariamente crea el compromiso al hecho de que existe un grupo de derechos que poseen todos los seres humanos a través de la historia. Esta interpretación es vulnerable al problema de la transhistoricidad de los DH: Se identifican los DH con los derechos naturales; lo que es problemático pues el estado moral y social en las comunidades antiguas muchas veces se reducía a formas de organización social rudimentarias que no describen las prácticas actuales que protegen los DH. La visión ortodoxa hace frente al problema de la transhistoricidad mediante dos estrategias:

i.         Abstracción. En esta estrategia se identifica un grupo de DH que son trasnhistóricos en su alcance y el trato a una gran mayoría de los DH como instrumentos internacionales que fueron surgiendo por la aplicación de derechos abstractos en circunstancias históricas específicas. Dentro de esta estrategia se ubica James Griffin quien enumera tres DH que considera son transhitóricos: el derecho a la autonomía, al bienestar (mínimo) y a la libertad. (32) Un problema para esta estrategia es que los derechos que estipula deben poseer universalidad transhistórica. Podrán existir derechos con un mayor o menor nivel de universalidad, Griffin usa esto a su favor diciendo que los derechos con un menor nivel de universalidad son válidos como DH porque provienen de aquellos derechos que contienen mayor universalidad. Así que los derechos con mayor nivel de universalidad deberán ser realmente derechos y no solamente intereses humanos universales. Los derechos se diferencian de los intereses, porque ellos crean obligaciones hacia los agentes. (33)

ii.         Idealización. Esta estrategia nos dice cómo especificar los deberes que corresponden a un derecho especifico haciendo referencia a condiciones ideales pero alcanzables (34). Por ejemplo incluso el hombre de las cavernas tiene derecho a un juicio justo porque este derecho depende de condiciones ideales para proteger intereses fundamentales aun cuando en su caso los medios para ello no se hayan realizado aún, por lo cual en el caso del hombre de las cavernas ese derecho no le da razones a nadie para hacer nada porque las circunstancias aun no existen. Esta estrategia disminuye la relación entre los DH y sus correspondientes deberes: logran la transhistoricidad a costa de perder la capacidad de generar deberes que guían la conducta de otros en relación con el agente que porta el derecho. (34) El autor como respuesta al problema de la transhistoricidad propone abandonar la interpretación transhistorica de la universalidad de los DH y decir sólo que son derechos universales de nuestro tiempo. Así que Tasioulas afirma que para hablar de los DH debemos especificar en qué periodo histórico se encuentran los seres humanos de quienes hablamos, y si entendemos a los DH como parte de la cultura contemporánea de los DH, el único periodo relevante será la modernidad (35).

(c) En virtud de su HUMANIDAD

Esta condición especifica dos rasgos de los DH:

i.         No es necesario para que los DH existan que sean positivos en la ley, socialmente reconocidos o reclamables jurídicamente (36). La existencia de los DH es independiente a las prácticas sociales y la ley (37).

ii.         Hay cierto tipo de condiciones que no puede determinar los requisitos para poseer derechos humanos y el contenido normativo de esos derechos. La posesión de los DH no puede ser condicional a cierto tipo de conducta o de logros de la persona o aun a su pertenencia a algún grupo. Pero esto es problemático en los casos del derecho al voto o a la educación que son condicionales a pertenecer a cierto grupo. Se puede entonces distinguir entre DH propiamente dichos y otros derechos más específicos derivados de los primeros (39). Los derechos derivados NO serán derechos humanos si dependen de circunstancias y hechos que no aplican a TODOS los seres humanos en el periodo histórico actual.

Por ejemplo, mi derecho humano a la participación política combinado con el hecho de que soy mexicano me da derecho a votar en las elecciones federales; pero sólo el primero es un DH no el segundo.

Mejorando N

Existe el problema de que N puede ser demasiado inclusiva en el sentido de fallar en capturar la importancia y carácter distintivo de los DH permitiendo que sean considerados como DH normas que no lo son (40) como por ejemplo derechos que pueden ser triviales o demasiado privados. Tasioulas propone reformular N como razones pro tanto.

Los DH son derechos morales que poseen todos los seres humanos en virtud de su humanidad en cuanto a que siempre hay razones pro tanto para dotarlos de protección social. (N*)

Esta inclusión de la protección social puede significare dos cosas: por una parte, hay una interpretación que es no-coercitiva e informal, que meramente ayuda a la discusión de los DDHH. Hay otra interpretación coercitiva y formal, que es la que da a los DDHH un estatus legal y con un papel de discusión para aquellas formas de la moralidad que se encuentran dentro de la legalidad de los DDHH. Y  a partir de esta consideración se realiza otra formulación de N como:

Los DDHH son derechos morales que poseen todos los seres humanos en virtud de su humanidad y en cuanto a que siempre hay razones para promulgarlos como derechos legalmente exigibles. (N**)

El desarrollo que hace Tasioulas respecto de N** es problemático, pues muestra las dificultades por las que los DH no pueden ser considerados como consecuencias legales, esto desde su postura de una visión ortodoxa, pues afirma que un teórico ortodoxo aceptara tanto N como N*. Para eso discute con Sen quien afirma que no es necesaria la ejecución de los derechos de manera legal para que tomen y tengan fuerza para que sean satisfechos.

TLeer con atención el Capítulo 5 del libro seminal de Beitz:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/c0wwfm496hwqizt/FreshStartCharles%20R.%20Beitz.pdf?dl=0

CONTESTAR LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS:

• ¿Cómo se justifica que la lista de DH de Rawls sea más pequeña?
• ¿Cuál es el rol de los DH en la sociedad de los pueblos?
• ¿Qué caracteriza una idea práctica de los DH?
• Explique la estrategia de los dos niveles de Beitz

La Visión Política: Beitz

 Tesis Central: Las concepciones naturalistas y las de consentimiento tratan a los DDHH como expresiones de una idea filosófica abstracta y sectaria. La visión política de los DDHH deja fuera las concepciones filosóficas, morales e ideales y se centra en una doctrina política construida para cumplir con un rol específico en la arena internacional (96). Este rol se define según Beitz según la concepción de Razón Pública de los pueblos (98).

1. El Derecho de los Pueblos de Rawls. Presenta una concepción de la razón pública que se establece en la sociedad internacional de democracias liberales y estados decentes. (96) Los DDHH son una subclase de normas pertenecientes a la razón pública, que a su vez se entiende como un conjunto de normas y principios compartidos. La posibilidad de que principios y normas sean compartidos por todos los miembros de la Sociedad de Pueblos hace posible que se establezcan deberes de civilidad y de estabilidad de mutuo respeto y paz (96). En ese sentido los DDHH son en cierto modo neutrales con respecto a las concepciones de justicia política. La idea de un acuerdo intercultural no juega parte determinante de la justificación o definición de los DH (98). Los DDHH constituyen una doctrina política construida para cumplir ciertos propósitos políticos. Esta función discursiva de los DDHH en la razón pública de la Sociedad de los Pueblos es básica: ella define (1) la naturaleza del los DDHH y (2) explica, o ayuda a explicar, porque los DDHH tienen el contenido tan particular que poseen (99).

1.     Los DH son una clase especial de derechos urgentes porque son indispensables para cualquier idea de la justicia basada en el bien común que no sea específicamente liberal o que pertenezca sólo a tradición Occidental (97).

2.     La idea de los DDHH no agota los derechos que se establecen en el derecho internacional de los DDHH. En la visión de Rawls los valores omitidos son las “aspiraciones liberales” o “presuponer tipos específicos de instituciones.” (97)

3.     La fuerza política (moral) de los DDHH se extiende a todas las sociedades incluidas las sociedades fuera de la legalidad.  Los DDHH como los concibe Rawls son universales en el sentido que se aplican a todas las sociedades contemporáneas.

4.     El significado político de los DDHH está dado por su papel especial en la razón pública de la Sociedad de los Pueblos. Una sociedad cuyas instituciones incumplen los DDHH se hace susceptible a la condena de la sociedad de los pueblos; y se hace vulnerable a la intervención internacional. (98)

Los DDHH definen entonces el alcance y los límites de la tolerancia internacional (99): podemos aceptar que hay un profundo desacuerdo respecto al contenido de los DDHH, pero todos pueden aceptar el papel o rol que cumplen los DDHH en el razonamiento práctico sobre la conducta global de la vida política (99). Este rol define el concepto de los derechos humanos. Los DDHH es necesaria para pertenecer a la Sociedad de los Pueblos y por ello protege una sociedad en contra de reformas intervencionistas. Por ello los DDHH sirven como estándares de legitimidad internacional (100). Pero el problema es que este papel es simplemente estipulado por Rawls y este papel es mucho más estrecho al que se puede observar en la práctica usual (101). Por ejemplo Rawls no ve a los DDHH como parte necesaria de las constituciones ni como justificaciones para reformas.

2. La Idea de una concepción Práctica de los DH. Los DDHH son razones para la acción (104). El objetivo de Beitz es articular cómo los DH operan con el discurso normativo de la vida política global. (105). Mientras que las concepciones naturalistas y del acuerdo son fundacionalistas en sentido moral-universalista, el objetivo del autor es el de comprender el concepto de los DDHH como ocurre dentro de la práctica discursiva existente, para lo cual se necesita un modelo que capture los aspectos sobresalientes de esa práctica. La visión práctica prescinde de una postura filosófica acerca de la naturaleza y fundamento de los DH. Los DDHH son tomados como una actividad política colectiva con propósitos y modos de acción específicos. (103) La visión practica permite un desacuerdo en la naturaleza de los DH, pero no se debe estar en desacuerdo con el fundamento de los DDHH. (104)

Una concepción práctica pretende tomar la doctrina y la práctica de los DDHH como se encuentra en la vida política internacional como el material para la construcción del concepto de los DDHH formando un discurso normativo, lo cual define tanto la naturaleza como el contenido de los DH (no son independientes del plano internacional) (102). Entender qué son los DDHH nos lleva a entender el rango de consideraciones que determinan el contenido de los DDHH y explicar porque debemos de cuidar y respetar de ellos. Los DDHH no describen lo que es común a todos los códigos morales, sino que da los estándares comunes inferidos de ellos. Las concepciones fundamentalistas ven la fuerza de los DDHH como interna a su naturaleza.

3. El modelo de dos niveles de Beitz. Este modelo pretendo describir en términos generales el papel que juegan los DDHH en el discurso normativo de las políticas globales. Afirma que los DDHH son un fenómeno social cuyo significado depende de la forma en la que sus participantes estén comprometidos con él. (106) Los dos niveles se refieren a la división del trabajo entre estados como aquellos que cargan con la responsabilidad primaria de respetar y proteger los DDHH y la comunidad internacional y aquellos que actúan como agentes que garantizarán esas responsabilidades. El primer nivel pertenece a los estados en un nivel local, el segundo nivel pertenece a los estados en un sentido internacional. (108) Existen cuatro consideraciones a este modelo:

El modelo consiste en tres elementos:

1.     Los DDHH son requisitos cuyo objetivo es proteger intereses individuales urgentes en contra de daños predecibles a los que las personas son vulnerables en circunstancias típicas.

2.     Los DH se aplican en primera instancia a instituciones políticas de los estados (instituciones, leyes, políticas públicas) Este “primer nivel” se divide en tres tipos generales: a) respeto a los intereses en las actividades oficiales de los estados; b) proteger los intereses en contra de amenazas de agentes no-estatales; c) ayuda a aquellos que son víctimas involuntarias.

3.     Los DH son una cuestión de consentimiento internacional. En este “segundo nivel” se dan tres tipos de circunstancias: a) la comunidad internacional puede hacer responsables a los estados por sus responsabilidades de primer nivel; b) agentes que son estados y aquellos que no lo son tienen razones pro tanto para ayudar a los estados para satisfacer los estándares de los DDHH en el caso en el que estado no esté capacitado para hacerlo; c) los Estados y agentes (no estatales) tienes razones pro tanto para intervenir en un estado que no pueda garantizar los DDHH. (109)

La justificación de los DDHH dependerá de generalizaciones empíricas sobre la naturaleza de la vida social y el comportamiento de instituciones políticas y sociales. El modelo de los dos niveles puede ser criticado por su carácter individualista, sin embargo, la construcción de los DDHH se hace dirigida a proteger ciertos valores de importancia social. Pero hay un elemento de individualismo necesario para considerar a los intereses como DH, pues aquellos valores socialmente importantes que se toman como parte de los DH  son considerados porque los miembros de una comunidad (ciudadanos) les dan importancia al ser individuos pensados como independientes del grupo. Así que dentro de los DH no cabe una dimensión colectivista. (111-112)

4. Crítica de los Derechos Manifiestos. El Modelo de dos niveles entiende los DH como razones pro tanto para la acción. Las razones pro tanto son derrotables por lo cual no registran lo que propiamente constituye tener un derecho. (117) Pero esto depende de una sobresimplificación: Las responsabilidades en el primer nivel son claras aunque en el segundo nivel surjan complicaciones. Para Joel Feinberg, los DH son manifiestos morales que no están necesariamente correlacionados con deberes particulares pero que de cualquier manera pueden guiar nuestra acción (120).

5. Critica del Estatismo. El modelo también puede ser criticado por el rol prominente que le asigna a los estados.

________________________________________________________________

Unidad 2: Emisiones Contaminantes

Vamos a revisar un artículo académico del prof. Caney

https://www.dropbox.com/s/3g887hgt8t4wwi1/CANEY%20just%20emissions.pdf?dl=0


Como es un artículo y lo revisaremos varias clases lo dividiremos de una manera poco natural. Consideren esta división aproximada con sus respectivos cuestionarios.

TAREA: Lea las preguntas del cuestionario y con ellas en mente lea desde la pag. 255 hasta la 264 del artículo de Caney Caney, Simon, (2012), “Just Emissions”, Philosophy &Public Affairs, 40(4).

1. ¿Cual es la diferencia principal entre los distintos tipos de metodología que se emplean para pensar normativamente el problema de mas emisiones?

2. ¿Cuál es la visión convencional de justicia distributiva en emisiones?

3. ¿En qué consiste la defensa suficientaria de la visión convencional?

TAREA: Lea las preguntas del cuestionario y con ellas en mente lea desde la pag. 264 hasta la 276 del artículo de Caney Caney, Simon, (2012), “Just Emissions”, Philosophy &Public Affairs, 40(4).

1. ¿Cuál es la diferencia fundamental entre la vision del igualitarismo de la suerte en contraste con la suficientaria?
2. ¿Cuál es el atractivo de la tercera vía intuicionista?
3. ¿Qué tension existe entre los argumentos que tienen la forma paternalista y los que tienen forma fidecomisiaria?

TAREA: Leer del mismo artículo de las páginas 277 a la 291. Contestar las siguientes preguntas:

1. ¿Por qué las razones pragmáticas no desplazan a los argumentos igualitaristas que prefiere Caney?
2. ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre wide substitutability y narrow substitutability, y por qué es importante?
3. ¿Cuál es la respuesta de Caney al Segundo reto general?

TAREA: Leer del mismo artículo de las páginas 292 a la 298. Contestar las siguientes preguntas:

1. ¿Bajo qué metodología puede Caney plantear un nuevo comienzo para una teoría de la distribución de emisiones?
2. ¿Qué deberes establece la condición de sustentabilidad?
3. ¿Cuál es el límite central del planteamiento?

La clase del 27 de febrero vamos a ver la rúbrica del examen, luego hablaremos un poco de cómo vamos y cómo les funciona el diseño del curso para después darle la palabra a Adrián que nos hablará del concepto de DDHH de Habermas. Si hay tiempo comenzaré con el tema, pero no creo terminar la primera división. De cualquier manera ya tienen la lectura y el cuestionario por si desean ir adelantando. Por cierto, olvidé decirles que ya comencé mi curso de la unam y como seguramente vieron en la otra entrada del blog, el curso es de otro tipo con otra lectura. Si alguien no tiene suficiente con lo que hacemos, es bienvenido a la unam. La unam también es de ustedes. Si alguien esta interesado en estos temas seguramente será benéfico hacerlo junto con otros alumnos.

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras
Lunes 16-18 hrs
Salón 16 del antigua área de posgrados.

Just Emissions: Caney [1]

Central Problem. Given that there is a fixed limit on the volume of greenhouse gases that may be permissibly emitted, how should rights to emit greenhouse gases be distributed? (256). How should the right to emit greenhouse gases be distributed? (255).

Central Thesis. The dominant view (Equal per Capita) is flawed: Caney criticizes the claim that emissions should be distributed in an egalitarian fashion (he is not criticizing equality in itself (either as a global or as a domestic ideal). He rejects the best four arguments for equal per capita distribution. First, there is no good argument for the equal per capita view (section III). However, we conceive justice along the lines canvassed by Model I or Model II, neither of these approaches would support the equal per capita view or the Isolationist approach to greenhouse gas emissions on which it depends (sections IV–VII). His critique of the equal per capita view is thus not dependent on any one particular theory of justice; rather, it is robust across a wide variety of different theories of justice. Second, and more radically, what he calls the First General Challenge reveals that there is no good reason to adopt a Method of Isolation for greenhouse gas emissions (sections IV–VI). He wishes to introduce a Second General Challenge to the equal per capita view, and indeed to any view that treats greenhouse gases in isolation (183). These challenges undermine not only the equal per capita view, but any approach that treats the distribution of rights to emit in isolation from other issues of justice. Finally, he outlines an alternative way of thinking about greenhouse gas emissions (section VIII). However his aim is to set out the methodology. His claim is that following his five-step process would enable us to determine what would be a fair distribution of greenhouse gas emissions.

Case/Facts.

   i.         If humanity emits fewer than one trillion metric tons of carbon in the period between 1750 and 2500, then there is a 50 percent chance of avoiding dangerous climate change (defined as a 2°C increase over preindustrial times). They add that approximately half of this figure has been emitted, so humanity is left with just under half a trillion metric tons of carbon to emit.[2]

 ii.         China has made clear that its priority is to meet its development needs (279). This would not matter if China’s participation in a climate agreement were not essential, but China is now the world’s largest emitter and is responsible for 24 percent of global CO2 emissions per annum.

iii.         Treaties preventing the destruction of the ozone layer, Richard Benedick argues that agreement was possible only because the parties linked the distribution of CFCs with two other “goods” (the transfer of substitute technologies and financial assistance to developing countries) and with one “bad” (the threat of trade restrictions) (280).

iv.         Currently, decision making for various issues is dispersed (282). Thus, there are the meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP), which are designed to reach global climate agreements; there is the World Trade Organization to address global trade; there is the International Labour Organization to address issues surrounding labour rights; there is the United Nations to deal with issues of violent conflict; and so on.

 v.         Agricultural use: This is responsible for about 10–12 percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (75). The four main sources of agricultural emissions are nitrous oxide (N2O) from the use of fertilizers, methane (CH4) from enteric fermentation, methane produced during the cultivation of rice, and methane and nitrous oxide from manure (288).

Three responsibilities.

·      Mitigation. Involves limiting the flow of greenhouse gas emissions but also includes maintaining greenhouse gas sinks (for example, forests) which involves certain opportunity costs (257). But mitigation alone is insufficient.

·      Adaptation. Where an agent is threatened by a climatic change, an action counts as adaptation if it prevents that climatic change from undermining or restricting that agent’s ability to do what they are entitled to do. For instance, building seawalls to protect communities from rising sea levels and storm surges (257).[3]

·      Compensation. In case that mitigation and adaptation is insufficient, is required.

Methodology.

Atomism. we should treat each of the responsibilities separately (158).

Holism. We should treat all the responsibilities en masse

Mix. one that treats two climate responsibilities together as a package and a third separately (159).

Method of Isolation. it isolates the responsibilities associated with climate change from a consideration of other issues (like poverty, trade, and development).

Method of Integration. it treats climatic responsibilities in light of a general account of global justice (159).

Equal Per Capita View: The Atomist-Isolationist view: A just distribution of the right to emit greenhouse gases is one in which the permits to emit greenhouse gases are distributed according to a principle of equality (260). The family of these views defer in the following:

·      The Scope:

§  Global: olds that this ideal should be applied across the whole world

§  Domestic: applies within the state.

·      The Right Bearer: Who possesses the fundamental (as opposed to derivative) moral right to emit greenhouse gases (260)?

§  Individualism:

§  Statism (261):

·      The attitude regarding past emissions: How much the current and future distribution of emission rights should take into account past emissions?

§  History-Sensitive: current and future allocations of emission rights should take past emissions into account, holding that those with a history of higher than equal emissions should have fewer emissions in the future

§  History Insensitive: it would be unjust to take past emissions into account when determining the distribution of current and future greenhouse gas emissions.

§  Mix: also adopts a history-sensitive approach but, unlike the second view, holds that those who have emitted more than equal amounts of greenhouse gases in the past should, at least for a short period, continue to have more than equal shares and that we move toward equality over time.

Sufficientarianism. Non-egalitarian: justice requires that people attain a certain threshold standard of living (Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98 (1987): 21–43.)(262).

§  (P1) Justice requires that each person enjoy a certain threshold standard of living, including (at the very least) that basic needs are met (263).

§  (P2) People have equal basic needs in the use of greenhouse gas emissions.

§  Therefore, there should be equal emission rights.

Egalitarian Objection: It is invalid because even if (P1) and (P2) were correct, it would tolerate inequalities of any emissions left over once the sufficientarian threshold has been attained. But the objection is not straight forward. In practice meeting the sufficiency level would actually use up all the emissions available, so there would be no remainder that could be distributed unequally. But empirical conditions for this are hard to obtain: it would depend on (at least) three variables:

(i) how high one sets the “sufficiency” standard,

(ii) the extent to which attaining the specified standard of living requires emitting greenhouse gases (for example, through the use of fossil fuels rather than other energy sources), and

(iii) how much greenhouse gas emissions may permissibly be emitted before triggering dangerous climate change.

Even if we believe that the conditions will obtain (wich seems possible), the sufficientarian argument for greenhouse gas egalitarianism fails because (P2) is clearly false (264). People have unequal needs. [EC1] For example, some have a greater need for fuel to keep them warm. Some have greater need for electricity because they require medical equipment. Others have a greater need for transportation because they are handicapped. If we recognize this, though, we have no reason to accept (P2) and, hence, no reason to accept this argument’s case for the equal per capita view

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[1] Caney, Simon, (2012), “Just Emissions”, Philosophy &Public Affairs, 40(4).

[2] Myles R. Allen, David J. Frame, et al., “Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon Emissions towards the Trillionth Tonne,” Nature 458 (2009): 1163–66. This explicitly sets aside other greenhouse gas emissions (p. 1166).

[3] report commissioned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) found that “global investment needs for adaptation could amount to $49–$171 billion per annum by 2030, of which about half would accrue in developing countries (258).

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 [EC1]Clearly sufficientarian can leave behind P2 without risking coherence

Luck-Egalitarianism: Axel Gosseries: luck egalitarians tend to value equality of the total package of goods rather than one item, but, holism could be dismissed for isolationism: he argues that applying luck egalitarianism to one specific good like greenhouse gas emissions (what, following Jon Elster, he terms a “local” approach [pp. 282–83]) can be justified on “methodological” and practical grounds (p. 283). To see this, consider first orthodox theories:

(2) Standard theories (G.A. Cohen & Dworkin) (265): persons should have equal shares of “welfare” or “resources” or “access to advantage” or “opportunity for welfare” or “capability to function” or goods for short. Can any of these well-known versions of egalitarianism defend the equal per capita view? Consider the following principle:

E: Justice requires equality of “goods,” which, in turn, requires an equal per capita distribution of greenhouse emissions.

But, still it seems that conventional egalitarian theories thus provide us with no reason to

embrace the equal per capita view[EC1] ; because standard theories are kind of “total package” theories soy they won’t commit with the distribution of only one good (isolationism). Consider two reasons:

i.    There are limits on the extent to which it is appropriate to lower a person’s share of one good X and increase their enjoyment of another good Y. and,

ii.   Specific combination of different goods should, insofar as it is possible, be sensitive to people’s choices.

(3)  Beitzian view: global Natural resources Egalitarianism: Global original position would adopt egalitarian natural resources principle: equal per capita distribution.

E* Justice requires equality of natural resources, which in turn requires an equal per capita distribution of greenhouse emissions (267).

(4)   Modified Luck Egalitarian of bundle of Global Natural Resources (Vanderheiden).

E**: Justice requires equality of the natural resources that are part of the global commons, which, in turn, requires an equal per capita distribution of greenhouse gas emissions (268).

The atmosphere is thus a “common global resource” not excludable by national boundaries (Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice, pp. 103–4, 224–25, and 248–49). So it can be the object of a more restricted kind of egalitarianism— one that calls for equality of those natural resources that are “common global resource[s]”—and holds that this revised kind of egalitarianism entails that greenhouse gases should be distributed on an equal per capita basis.

However objections to E** will also tell against E*. Suppose we accept that no natural resources contained within states may be included within the pot of natural resources to be distributed globally. Even so, Vanderheiden’s argument does not ground an equal per capita approach to the atmosphere. It would do so only if the use of the atmosphere were the only common global resource. There are many others as seabeds (269), absorptive capacity of oceans, fish stock, artic and antartic, orbits, electromagnetic spectrum; etc (270).

The General Challenge (271). As we saw above, none of the four arguments considered—sufficientarianism, standard egalitarianism, Beitzian natural resource egalitarianism, and modified natural resource egalitarianism have shown why we should adopt the Method of Isolation, and have a principle of distributive justice that applies solely to the emission of greenhouse gas emissions (272). Here there are some answers to that challenge:

1.     Appeal to exceptions. There are two models of theories of justice:

Methodology Box:

Theories of Distributive Justice: One’s position on both theses depends in part on the level of abstraction at which one is operating (272).
First Model	Second Model
Theories of distributive justice are concerned with the fair distribution of an overall package of goods (the wholly Integrationist Approach).	Specific Egalitarianism: In some well-recognized cases, principles can apply to some specific goods or bads considered in isolation (an Isolationist component) (James Tobin, “On Limiting the Domain of Inequality,” Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 263–77, at p. 264.).
Third Model (277). Intuitionism: contra to both Models I and II, distributive justice comprises a plurality of separate principles, each of which applies to a specific domain of human life. I argue that even this view (inspired by the work of Michael Walzer) would not support treating greenhouse gases in isolation. The longer draft is available from the author.
Explanation: This makes two claims. (i) At the most fundamental level, justice requires the fair distribution of a value (for example, welfare) according to a single principle. However, (ii) the fair distribution of this basic value (in this case, welfare) may require that some particular resources and opportunities that contribute to welfare should be distributed in very specific ways. The second claim maintains that there are certain resources or opportunities of which it is the case that unless one distributes them in particular ways, the ultimate fundamental value cannot be attained. To make this more concrete, imagine a theory that is, at the fundamental level, committed to maximinning welfare. Now suppose, as seems reasonable to suppose, that for people to enjoy the level of welfare required by the principle of maximinning welfare, it must be the case that everyone enjoys what Rawls terms “the social bases of self-respect.” (Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 59). And suppose, finally, that to provide the social bases of self-respect for all requires that civil and political rights be distributed equally. In such a case, it is true both (a) that at the most fundamental level justice requires distributing a good according to a single principle (in line with Model I) and yet, (b) at a more concrete level, to honour this fundamental principle in fact requires treating some different particular goods according to different particular principles (in line with Model II). (N. 45:273)

A.    Equal Rights Argument. The familiar case for isolation: the ascription of fundamental rights as non-substitutable goods that express our equal moral dignity. We think, for example, that it is impermissible that one citizen might have fewer rights to vote than a fellow citizen, even if the former has more of other goods (such as more money) civil and political rights (273). But greenhouse gas seems different from this case: it is wrong to distribute basic rights unequally Because civil rights have an important symbolic and expressive status that other goods and rights have not: they are taken to constitute persons’ equal status as citizens (274).

B.    Paternalist Argument.

There are some cases where it is important not simply that people have a fair total package of goods but also that they have certain particular goods; however, we cannot trust each person to ensure that. If we do not think they would choose wisely and if we think it is essential to have a certain amount of a good X, then justice requires treating this particular good, X, in isolation (274).

C.     Unreliable Trustee Argument. But now Suppose that some agents act as “trustees” for the rights and interests of others. States, for example (275). In any trustees regime one might wish to take steps to ensure that the trustee really does serve the interests of those in their care and does not simply abuse their position. Thus, where one has a system of trustees who might not discharge their duties appropriately, one has reason to distribute certain specific goods separately and on their own. To give the example of parents: rather than simply giving money to the parents, one might give vouchers that can only be spent on children in certain specified ways. So, one could distribute energy in an “in-kind” form without distributing greenhouse gas emissions. Distributing energy sources in an “in-kind” way to avoid abuse by unreliable trustees does not require distributing emission rights on their own.

Methodology Box

Theories of Distributive Justice
Full compliance theories: Integrationist:	Partial compliance theories: It has to deal with the problem of effective policy design (276).
Someone who adheres to an Integrationist theory of justice can, for example, also employ the sort of “in-kind” policy instrument that Tobin has in mind.	But this does not show, that, at the level of fundamental moral theory, some goods are governed by their own specific principle of justice.
Conclusion from methodology: A commitment to Model II, thus, does not undermine my contention that there is no reason to treat greenhouse gases in isolation.

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 [EC1]This is misleading. Egalitarian could instead add emissions to the standard account and point out that accounts which encompass distribution of emissions are more complete (holism)

1.     Appeal to practicality.

A.    The Intractability Argument. If considering greenhouse gases in light of a general theory of global distributive justice, precludes getting anything done, then it may seem advisable to rebut the general challenge by invoking pragmatic reasons.

The Conceptual rejoinder: One response to this would be simply to say that my argument is a claim about what is, in principle, a fair distribution of rights to emit greenhouse gases, and that when understood as such, the real world considerations about whether such an approach would hinder agreement or not are just not germane.

The assumption that avoiding deadlock requires us to embrace an Isolationist approach is disputable for two reasons (278).

Let us distinguish between a Maximal and a Minimal theory of global justice (Rainer Forst, “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice,” Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 160–79).

·      Maximal theory of global distributive justice account of the perfect ideal.

·      Minimal theory of global distributive justice seeks to identify what is absolutely essential.

Then the argument has two problems:

   i.         It is true that seek to realize Maximal ideals of global distributive justice could result in deadlock. This, however, does not give us reason to embrace Isolationism and eschew Integrationism, for one may examine the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions in conjunction with more Minimal accounts of global justice, and these are much more conducive to reaching international agreement.

 ii.         Isolationist approach is also extremely likely to generate intractable disputes. Developing countries, (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), are deeply opposed to an Isolationist approach (279). They argue that an equitable distribution of greenhouse gas emissions must take into account different countries’ needs.

/:So, isolating the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions from other issues does not necessarily facilitate agreement and will, in fact, prevent an international climate agreement that reduces emissions because at least one major player (China and perhaps also India) will not reduce emissions unless its developmental imperatives are borne in mind (280).

B.    The Impotence Argument. It is best to treat greenhouse gas distributions in isolation from other considerations (like poverty or trade) because this best corresponds to the current institutional division of labour at the global level (281). This argument raises three objections:

               i.         On an empirical level, the statement that all that is up for discussion at climate negotiations are emissions rights is false (281). To push this point one step further, one might argue that if what is distributed at climate negotiations are permits to emit greenhouse gases, which can be bought and sold for money, then the COP negotiations are, in effect, simply distributing money. John Broome and Andrew Williams both, independently, pointed out to me that if the entire “greenhouse gas budget” were distributed in the form of tradable permits to emit greenhouse gases, then this alone would be sufficient to undermine Isolationism. Such a scheme would in effect be distributing money.

              ii.         It is a fallacy to assume that just because (1) an agent A is only able to affect the distribution of one particular good, then (2), A is unable to distribute that good in ways that take into account the distribution of other goods (282). Climate negotiators can, for example, allocate a large share to the extremely disadvantaged on the grounds that they can sell some of these and then use the money generated to meet health or educational needs. It is thus perfectly possible for negotiators to distribute emission rights in an Integrationist fashion.

             iii.         Governments can, at the domestic level, make decisions about the fair distribution of greenhouse gas emissions in conjunction with decisions about poverty, education, health, and so on (282).

2.     Second General Challenge: Emissions in their Place: The key point that these three ways bring out is that greenhouse gas emissions are to some extent substitutable in the narrow sense (288). Insofar as we think that distributive justice should be concerned with the specific goods associated with greenhouse gas emissions, then, whatever metric of goods (and bads) we are employing, we should focus directly on the fair treatment of those specific goods (and be concerned with greenhouse gas emissions only to the extent that they, like other phenomena, are associated with those goods) (289).

Problem: May be there are limits to the extent to which we can substitute (in a wide sense) rights to emit greenhouse gases in the same way sleep, water, food cannot be substituted. In the same way emitting greenhouse gases is not substitutable because these are necessary for certain essential activities like cooking, heating, agriculture, and protection against the elements (285).

Consider first this distinction:

i.      Wide Substitutability: occurs when one substitutes one kind of good with another quite different kind of good without detriment to that person because their overall share of goods remains just (283).

ii.     Narrow Substitutability: X and Y are substitutes in the narrow sense when X and Y both possess the same kind of properties and thus can be used interchangeably to achieve that benefit.

The First General Challenge appeals to the concept of Wide Substitutability, for it exploits the possibility of some having fewer permits to emit greenhouse gases so long as they have a correspondingly greater share of other goods (283).

Second General Challenge: The equal per capita view’s focus on distributing permits to emit greenhouse gases is inappropriate because these permits are substitutable in a narrow sense. The specific goods that are associated with permits to emit greenhouse gases can be

provided in other ways (285). Consider three ways in which greenhouse gases are substitutable in a narrow sense (186).

·      Energy Efficiency: If one is a greenhouse gas egalitarian, one would have to conclude that this scenario is unfair: A and B have unequal emission rights, but because B is more efficient, B can in fact get the same amount of energy with his allocation (286). But this, it seems to me, is very odd. To all intents and purposes, B is now as well off as A: B has exactly the same opportunities as A does (and that B himself would have if he had had an increase in emissions but no increase in energy efficiency). This only reveals that the possession of greenhouse gas permits is instrumentally valuable, it has value only insofar as it promotes other valuable things.

·      Alternative Energy Sources: Rights to emit greenhouse gases are valuable, to a large extent, because they permit the use of fossil fuels to produce energy (287). The fact that it is possible to provide alternative energy sources thus entails that people need not have equal emissions if those who have fewer greenhouse gas emissions can have correspondingly more of another comparable energy source.

·      Alternative Agricultural Practices: The gases produced by farming are to some extent substitutable in the narrow sense: In each case, it is possible to continue to produce the same specific goods (such as the cultivation of crops and the production of meat and other animal products) but with reduced greenhouse gas emissions (288). It is also possible to reduce CH4 emissions from livestock by improving animal feed and altering it to prevent methanogenesis, and to capture CH4 to produce electricity and heat. Third, it is possible to reduce N20 and CO2 emissions resulting from rice production by using additives, and to reduce the CH4 emissions resulting from rice production by having better drainage and by using fertilizers that impede methanogenesis.

Problem 2: In some cases, two goods may not be perfect (narrow) substitutes. Consider, for example, non–fossil fuel energy sources (289):

i.      Supply is unreliable for physical reasons (for example, wind) or for geopolitical reasons.

ii.     More expensive to the consumer

iii.    Substitute has undesirable side effects on others that fossil fuels do not have (for example, involuntary displacement arising from constructing dams.

Caney´s Answer: Consider four types of substitution:

a)     Alternative has malign effects so simply should not be adopted.

b)    Alternative can act as perfect (narrow) substitutes.

c)     Some alternatives are actually superior to the existing use of greenhouse gas permits (290).

d)    An alternative energy source has some disadvantage for the consumer of energy, but where this can be compensated.

e)    This kind of case takes us out of the realm of pure Narrow Substitutability toward a continuum where substitutions can occur that combine aspects of both Narrow and Wide Substitutability (290).

According to e, the Second General Challenge holds: it is inappropriate to focus on greenhouse gas emissions when there are (narrow) substitutes for these emissions (291).

A New Start: Outline of the method by which one can work out what would constitute a fair share of emissions (so this does not constitute an advanced specific substantive answer) (292).

Normative Starting Point (291): To determine:

What´s distributive justice (291)?

What principles govern what is owed to all persons?

What principles govern what is owed to fellow citizens?

What principles govern the treatment of persons’ contemporaries and the treatment of future generations?

What principles govern the rights and responsibilities that persons inherit as a result of wrongdoing in the past?

“if it is inappropriate to treat greenhouse gases in isolation from other issues of justice (as was argued in sections IV–VI), and if, moreover, the emission of greenhouse gases has value only insofar as it enables people to enjoy their legitimate entitlements (as was argued in section VII), then it follows that an analysis of the fair distribution of greenhouse gas emissions must be grounded in an understanding of what persons (current and future, within one’s state and across the world) are entitled to do. To consider what would be a fair distribution of greenhouse gases, one must then start with an account of what persons are entitled to as a matter of justice, and work back from that to deduce what share of emissions they are entitled to (192).” This does not require a Maximal account of justice. It seems enough to assume that global and intergenerational distributive justice requires that the basic needs of all persons current and future and throughout the world are met (293).

The Sustainability Condition. Principles of justice have environmental preconditions. One must assess whether the account of distributive justice affirmed in Step 1 makes demands on the natural world that can in fact be met. This is a two-way condition:

A)     the realization of any proposed scheme of distributive justice is likely to have a marked effect on the natural world (what we might call “the environmental impact claim”), and

B)    Sustainability constraint: that the state of the natural world is likely to have an effect on the extent to which one can realize any given scheme of distributive justice. The realization of any proposed scheme of distributive justice specifying what rights people have over natural resources and what they are entitled to do (such as use rare minerals, drive, fly, use pollutants, build on land, engage in deforestation, and increase agricultural yield) is thus likely to have environmental impacts (294).

“The practices permitted by one component of a proposed theory of justice (for example, its account of what those currently alive are entitled to do) may have environmental effects which entail that another component of that theory (most notably its account of what those currently alive owe to future generations) simply cannot be attained.”

“What we need is an account of justice that does not have environmental impacts that undercut its ability to realize its own principles (295)”

“Where an account of distributive justice offered in Step 1 is incompatible with the “sustainability constraint” affirmed by Step 2, then we are required to re-examine the claims made in Step 1 and to make adjustments to its component parts (including its account of entitlements for contemporaries and future people) until it is sustainable.”

The Greenhouse Gas Implications. We must recall our account of a just and sustainable society (as determined by Steps 1 and 2) so we can determine what implications these principles of distributive justice have for the distribution of greenhouse gases (295). By identifying persons’ entitlements and then their implications for the use of greenhouse gas emissions, one can then derive an account of how greenhouse gas emissions should be distributed (297). For instance:

Food: The production and cultivation of food, its transportation, its storage, and the preparation of food all (normally) involve the emission of greenhouse gases (296). One can thus work back from people’s entitlement to food and derive an account of the greenhouse gas emissions needed to achieve this entitlement.

Health: Lighting and hygiene from clean water are essential even to help reduce women’s mortality rate at childbirth (297). Modern fuels and/or electricity are essential for these functions. Electricity is essential for many medical instruments, illumination, medical record keeping, communications facilities for reporting medically significant events, and medical training. From an understanding of what people’s health needs are, one can derive an account of how energy should be distributed.

The Narrow Substitutability Proviso. Now it is essential to note that realizing people’s entitlements may then, in practice, be compatible with a variety of different distributions of greenhouse gas emissions, depending on what other energy sources are employed. So Narrow substitutability has two key advantages over the equal per capita approach (298):

·      More freedom: since meeting people’s energy (and agricultural) needs can be done in more than one way, it offers those who are responsible for providing energy (and food) more freedom since it grants the relevant parties more leeway in how to discharge their duty (298).

·      Feasibility. It allows some to have higher emissions than would otherwise be the case, if they generate high amounts of clean technology for others and enable others to boost their energy efficiency. This renders it more politically realistic. Isolationist approaches, introduce a rigidity into any distributive framework, for they insist that the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions must take a certain specific shape.

Indeterminacy and The Role of Institutions. Since people’s needs and duties can be organized and discharged in different ways, there must be political fora or political process

where the participants decide whether particular people’s needs for energy are to be provided for by fossil fuels or hydroelectric or solar energy or by some other energy sources.

_______________________

Unidad 3: Pobreza (una o dos sesiones)

TAREA: Leer la entrada de "Poverty" del Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics  Contestar las siguientes 

preguntas:

1. ¿En qué principio está basada la analogía del niño del pozo de Singer?

2. ¿Por qué según Pogge la pobreza no es un problema de caridad sino de justicia?

3. ¿En qué sentido según Sen están relacionados la falta de libertad y la pobreza? 

NO HAY OTRO CUESTIONARIO hasta el tema de Inmigración

Leer la entrada "Poverty" del Routledge handbook of GE.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/z34akeaod4njxh0/The_Routledge%20Companion%20To%20Global%20Ethics.pdf?dl=0


________________________

Unidad 4: Inmigración

1. Leer del Routledge Companion to Global Ethics la entrada "Immigration" desde la página 193-198 

2. Contestar las siguientes grupos de preguntas conforme avancemos en las sesiones


i) ¿Por qué es necesario delimitar metodológicamente el caso de inmigración que sea objeto de una teoría ética de la inmigración?
ii) ¿Cuál es la relación conceptual entre el derecho de autodeterminación política, el derecho de asociación y el derecho de exclusión de los inmigrantes potenciales?
iii) ¿Por qué no se puede ejercer el derecho de asociación individualmente e invitar al migrante sin que el estado lo impida?


i) ¿Cuál es la relación conceptual entre cultura, identidad y derechos de exclusión de los inmigrantes potenciales?
ii) ¿Cuál es el papel de las obligaciones asociativas en la justificación de la exclusión de los inmigrantes?
iii) ¿Cuál es el problema más serio que tienen este tipo de argumentos?


i) ¿Por qué para Kant la inmigración es un problema de justicia?
ii) ¿Cuál es la relación conceptual entre la propiedad privada y el derecho a excluir a los inmigrantes potenciales?

iii) ¿Los estados actuales tienen el derecho de exclusión según los estándares de Kant?

https://www.dropbox.com/s/z34akeaod4njxh0/The_Routledge%20Companion%20To%20Global%20Ethics.pdf?dl=0